Development record · Version 0.1

Source Register

Primary and authoritative sources classified by status, applicability, usable principles, limitations and provenance.

Version: 0.1 research baseline
Research cut-off: 16 August 2026
Purpose: traceable source base for the category definition, gap analysis, candidate requirements and Standard v0.1

1. How to read this register#

This is a targeted normative-landscape review, not a claim to have exhausted every jurisdiction, profession or decision-science literature. Sources were selected because they address one or more concrete problems in the proposed category. Official and original sources are preferred. Search pages, summaries and vendor commentary were used only to locate primary material and are not relied upon as authority.

Normative status describes a source in its own field. It does not mean the source binds every second-opinion practitioner. Formal professional standards can be mandatory through law, adoption, membership or engagement terms; governance codes commonly operate on a comply-or-explain basis; research and established practice are evidential rather than normative.

Conflict includes both direct disagreement and category mismatch. Most tensions found are not contradictions between sources, but limits on transplanting an audit, assurance, public-project or AI rule into a non-assurance, cross-sector decision review.

2. Corporate governance and decision authority#

ID Bibliographic record, type and normative status Scope and relevant topics Usable principles Limitations, conflicts and applicability Provenance
GOV-01 G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2023, OECD, 2023. Intergovernmental governance principles; influential, non-binding unless implemented. Listed-company governance; board responsibility, informed decision-making, conflicts, objective judgment, delegation. Boards should act on a fully informed basis, with care and in the company's interest; exercise objective independent judgment; manage conflicts; retain responsibility when work is delegated. Broad governance framework, not an engagement standard. It allocates board accountability but does not define an external second opinion, its evidence threshold or report. No direct conflict; prevents transfer of client decision authority. Primary official source: OECD full report, especially board responsibilities.
GOV-02 UK Corporate Governance Code 2024, Financial Reporting Council, 2024. Governance code; applies on a comply-or-explain basis within its UK listing scope from 2025, with Provision 29 from 2026. UK listed companies; board judgment, constructive challenge, information, time and advice. Boards require accurate, timely and clear information; non-executive directors should provide constructive challenge; directors need resources, time and access to advice; responsibility remains with the board. Jurisdiction- and issuer-specific. It supports the demand for challenge but does not establish examiner independence or a second-opinion method. Primary official source: FRC code page and PDF.
GOV-03 Guidance on the UK Corporate Governance Code, Financial Reporting Council, updated 3 June 2026. Professional/governance guidance; non-binding. Board dynamics, information quality, assumptions, models, challenge and use of assurance sources. Effective boards expose assumptions and models to challenge, receive balanced information and use internal and external sources without displacing judgment. Illustrative guidance tied to GOV-02. It is useful for failure modes, not a universal conformance basis. Primary official source: FRC guidance.
GOV-04 Dutch Corporate Governance Code 2025, Monitoring Committee Corporate Governance Code, 2025. Governance code legally anchored for relevant Dutch listed companies; comply or explain. Long-term value creation, risk management, management and supervisory-board responsibilities, conflicts and information. Supports accountable governance, independent supervision, conflict management and adequate information. National listed-company context; not an independent-review standard and not used to universalise Dutch governance structures. Primary official source: Monitoring Committee, English publication page.
GOV-05 Companies Act 2006, sections 172 and 174, UK Parliament, 2006 as amended. Binding law within its jurisdiction. Director duties: promoting company success; reasonable care, skill and diligence. Demonstrates that external input does not replace directors' own legal duties and that decision authority remains legally situated. UK-specific law; not a source of direct duties for a global second-opinion practitioner. Other jurisdictions differ. Used only for boundary confirmation. Primary legislation: section 172 and section 174.

3. Internal audit, assurance, audit and professional ethics#

ID Bibliographic record, type and normative status Scope and relevant topics Usable principles Limitations, conflicts and applicability Provenance
IA-01 Global Internal Audit Standards, The Institute of Internal Auditors, issued 2024, effective 9 January 2025. Formal professional standards for internal audit. Objectivity, impairment, competence, due professional care, skepticism, engagement scope, criteria, evidence, documentation, dissent, reporting and quality. Particularly useful are Standards 2.1–2.3, 3.1, 4.2–4.3, 13.1–13.6, 14.1 and 14.6, and 15.1: identify and manage impairment; use competent resources; apply skeptical judgment; define scope; obtain relevant, reliable and sufficient information; document a defensible trail; report limitations and unresolved differences. Internal audit has a charter, organisational position and ongoing mandate that an external or ad hoc second-opinion practitioner may not have. Internal-audit assurance uses criteria and its own governance. The “prudent, informed and competent person could repeat the work and reach the same conclusions” formulation is informative but may be too audit-specific as a universal decision-review threshold. Primary official source: IIA standards page and official PDF.
IA-02 The IIA's Three Lines Model — Statement of Position, The Institute of Internal Auditors, 8 July 2026. Authoritative professional position, not a mandatory engagement standard. Governance roles; governing body, management, internal audit and external providers; accountability and independence. Separates governing accountability and management action from internal audit's independent assurance/advice; independence is protected by not assuming management responsibility. Role model for organisations, not a category definition. An independent second opinion may sit outside all three internal lines. It cautions against role substitution but does not supply evidence or reporting requirements. Primary official source: IIA Statements of Position and Three Lines Model PDF.
ASR-01 International Standard on Assurance Engagements 3000 (Revised), Assurance Engagements Other than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial Information, IAASB, 2013, effective 15 December 2015; current in the 2025 Handbook. Formal assurance standard. Engagement acceptance, rational purpose, suitable subject matter and criteria, competence, ethics/independence, professional skepticism and judgment, evidence, experts, reporting, scope limitations and modified conclusions. Strong analogue for acceptance, competence, evidence discipline, expert use, limitations and bounded reporting. Most important as a boundary: assurance requires an assurance purpose and suitable criteria, and is designed to enhance intended-user confidence in subject-matter information. A decision second opinion is not necessarily a criteria-based assurance engagement and must not imply reasonable or limited assurance. Importing assurance terms without the framework would mislead. Where an engagement actually meets the assurance definition, the applicable assurance framework prevails. Primary official source: IAASB ISAE 3000 page.
ASR-02 International Standard on Related Services 4400 (Revised), Agreed-Upon Procedures Engagements, IAASB, 2019. Formal related-services standard, effective 1 January 2022. Acceptance, agreed procedures, professional judgment, experts and factual-findings reports without assurance. Demonstrates a disciplined non-assurance service and the need to state exactly what was and was not performed. An agreed-upon procedures engagement reports factual findings and does not express the independent evaluative conclusion central to this category. It is adjacent, not a template. Primary official source: IAASB ISRS 4400 page.
ASR-03 International Standard on Auditing 500, Audit Evidence, IAASB, current version in the 2025 Handbook. Formal audit standard. Sufficiency and appropriateness of evidence, relevance, reliability and responses to inconsistency or doubt. Supplies a mature distinction between quantity and quality of evidence and supports evidence-relative conclusions and attention to source reliability. Financial-statement audit has a defined assurance objective, assertions and audit-risk model. “Sufficient appropriate evidence” has assurance meaning and should not be used as an unexplained claim of assurance in this Standard. Revised proposals current in 2026 were not treated as final. Primary official compilation: IAASB 2025 Handbook.
ASR-04 International Standard on Auditing 620, Using the Work of an Auditor's Expert, IAASB, current version in the 2025 Handbook. Formal audit standard. Expert competence, capabilities and objectivity; scope; evaluation of expert work; auditor responsibility. Strong analogue for material reliance: assess the provider and work, agree/understand scope, evaluate relevance and retain responsibility for one's conclusion. Applies to auditors and auditor's experts; it does not automatically govern commercial advisers, client experts or third-party diligence. The exact audit procedures are not transplanted. Primary official source: IAASB ISA 620 project and standard references and ASR-03 handbook.
ASR-05 International Standard on Auditing 220 (Revised), Quality Management for an Audit of Financial Statements, IAASB, 2020, effective 15 December 2022. Formal audit standard. Engagement leadership, review, consultation, differences of opinion and engagement-partner responsibility. Differences within the team or with reviewers/consultants are addressed and resolved under firm policy before dating an audit report; the engagement partner remains responsible. This supports taking dissent seriously and not using a reviewer to transfer responsibility. Audit-specific release blocking cannot simply be universalised. A multidisciplinary second opinion may legitimately disclose a material unresolved dissent rather than force consensus, subject to report integrity. Primary official compilation: IAASB 2025 Handbook.
ASR-06 International Standard on Quality Management 1, Quality Management for Firms that Perform Audits or Reviews of Financial Statements, or Other Assurance or Related Services Engagements, IAASB, 2020, effective 15 December 2022. Formal firm-level quality-management standard. Resources, consultation, differences of opinion, engagement performance and monitoring. Provides mature examples of controlled consultation, resolution, documentation and quality responsibility. It regulates firms performing specified IAASB engagements, not all second-opinion providers. Firm-wide quality systems, inspections and engagement quality reviews are outside the category's minimum requirements. Primary official source: IAASB quality-management standards overview and ASR-03 handbook.
ASR-07 AS 1220: Engagement Quality Review, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, current standard and amendment effective 15 December 2026. Binding for PCAOB-registered firms within its US audit scope. Reviewer competence, independence, integrity and objectivity; significant judgments; unresolved matters; responsibility. A reviewer must not make decisions for the engagement team; the engagement partner retains responsibility; significant matters must be addressed before concurring approval. US public-company audit only. The 2026 amendment is not used before its effective date. A universal second opinion need not have a separate engagement-quality reviewer. Useful for output-authorisation and role boundaries by analogy. Primary regulator source: current PCAOB AS 1220 and future-effective amendment.
ASR-08 AS 1215: Audit Documentation, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. Binding within PCAOB audit scope. Documentation sufficiency, experienced-auditor understanding, completion and retention. Supports a record from which an informed reviewer can understand work, evidence, judgments and conclusions. Audit retention, completion dates and “experienced auditor” tests are legally specific. v0.1 uses an informed independent reviewer test without importing PCAOB retention rules. Primary regulator source: PCAOB AS 1215.
ETH-01 2025 Handbook of the International Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (including International Independence Standards), IESBA, 2025. Formal professional ethics code for professional accountants and specified assurance practitioners. Integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality, professional behaviour; threats and safeguards; reasonable and informed third-party test. Supplies a mature threat-based model: identify, evaluate and address self-interest, self-review, advocacy, familiarity and intimidation threats; decline or end work when threats cannot be reduced acceptably. Profession-specific and, for independence standards, engagement-specific. It cannot be declared binding on all second-opinion practitioners. Its conceptual framework is a strong analogue. Confidentiality and legal compliance remain subject to applicable law and contract. Primary official source: IESBA Code page and 2025 Handbook.
ETH-02 IESBA revisions and staff Q&A on Using the Work of an External Expert, issued 2024–2025, effective 15 December 2026. Formal amendments not yet effective at the research cut-off; staff Q&A is non-authoritative guidance. Expert competence, capabilities, objectivity and threats when relying on external experts. Confirms international movement toward explicit evaluation of material expert inputs and objectivity, not mere credential checking. Future-effective and profession-specific; used as directional corroboration only, not as current authority. Primary official source/status: IESBA completed projects and staff Q&A.

4. Risk, due diligence and consultancy#

ID Bibliographic record, type and normative status Scope and relevant topics Usable principles Limitations, conflicts and applicability Provenance
RISK-01 ISO 31000:2018, Risk management — Guidelines, International Organization for Standardization, 2018, confirmed 2023; revision under development in 2026. International guidance standard; not certifiable. Risk as effect of uncertainty on objectives; integration, customisation, stakeholders, human factors and proportionality. Uncertainty is inherent rather than removable; risk work should be integrated, structured, customised and proportionate to context. Broad risk-management guidance, not a decision-review engagement standard and not a source for a universal risk model. The draft revision is not current authority. Primary official source: ISO 31000:2018.
RISK-02 Enterprise Risk Management—Integrating with Strategy and Performance, Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, 2017, with Risk Appetite—Critical to Success guidance, 2020. Authoritative professional framework/guidance, voluntary unless adopted. Strategy, performance, risk appetite, alternative strategies, risk severity and decision-making. Decisions should make uncertainty, appetite and trade-offs visible; evaluation should connect risk to objectives and performance. Enterprise-wide management framework; it may be an input to a second opinion but does not provide independent challenge, engagement acceptance or output rules. Primary issuer pages: COSO ERM and risk-appetite guidance.
DD-01 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, OECD, 2018. Intergovernmental guidance; recommended, sometimes referenced by binding regimes. Risk-based due diligence for adverse impacts, proportionality, ongoing review, stakeholder engagement and remediation. Demonstrates risk-based, context-sensitive and iterative evidence work rather than a one-time checklist. Subject matter is responsible-business-conduct impacts, not transaction or strategic decision quality. It does not define an independent opinion. Primary official source: OECD publication.
DD-02 Commercial Due Diligence Guideline, Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, current edition available 2026. Professional best-practice guidance, not a formal assurance standard. Transaction context, scope, roles, market evidence, assumptions, uncertainty, access, reporting and third-party use. Supports clear scope, transparent assumptions and limitations, decision relevance and careful reporting of material findings. Transaction-specific and often commissioned by an interested buyer, seller or lender. Independence may differ from this Standard; commercial due diligence can advise on deal strategy and does not necessarily deliver an adverse independent opinion. Primary professional source: ICAEW Commercial Due Diligence Guideline.
DD-03 Financial Due Diligence Guideline, Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, 2024. Professional best-practice guidance, not a formal assurance standard. Transaction scope, access, reliance, third-party report use, limitations and reporting. Particularly useful on specifying permitted reliance, understanding the original scope and avoiding unjustified reliance on third-party reports. Financial and transaction-specific; not an assurance opinion and not a general second-opinion standard. Contractual reliance conventions vary. Primary professional source: ICAEW guideline PDF.
CONS-01 ISO 20700:2017, Guidelines for management consultancy services, ISO, 2017, confirmed 2022. International guidance standard. Contracting, service delivery, transparency, client needs, outputs and closure. Supports clear engagement terms, roles, deliverables and communication. Consultancy normally helps the client solve or implement; independence and adverse-conclusion freedom are not constitutive. It is useful chiefly to draw the boundary where a second opinion becomes advice or implementation. Primary official source: ISO 20700:2017.

5. Established independent-review and transaction-gate practices#

ID Bibliographic record, type and normative status Scope and relevant topics Usable principles Limitations, conflicts and applicability Provenance
PRACT-01 Infrastructure and Projects Authority Assurance Review Toolkit, UK Infrastructure and Projects Authority, current collection accessed 2026. Government assurance/review practice mandatory or expected for specified public programmes under government arrangements. Independent review at decision gates, reviewer roles, evidence, recommendations and decision-maker use. Shows a practical institutional need for independent challenge at defined commitment points and a review that informs but does not make the decision. UK central-government project context; “assurance” is used in a public-programme sense and should not be mistaken for an IAASB assurance engagement. Gate structures are not universal. Primary government source: IPA Assurance Review Toolkit.
PRACT-02 OGC Gateway Review 3: Investment Decision — Guidance and Templates, UK government/IPA, current publication page. Established government gate-review practice. Pre-investment decision review, business-case readiness, affordability, risks and implementation preparedness. Closest practical analogue for timing: an independent review before a major commitment, designed to inform the responsible authority and not substitute for an audit opinion. Focused on projects/programmes and a prescribed public-sector lifecycle. It combines decision-basis and delivery-readiness questions that may be outside a bounded second opinion. Primary government source: Gateway Review 3.
PRACT-03 The State Project Model and Circular R-108/25, Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2025. Binding administrative model for covered Norwegian state investments. External quality assurance (QA1/QA2) before major investment decisions; conceptual choice, cost, uncertainty and decision documentation. Strong evidence that external ex ante review can be institutionalised, timed to commitment and kept distinct from the political or administrative decision. Threshold-based Norwegian public-investment regime; subject matter, panels and procedures are sector-specific. “Quality assurance” has a local administrative meaning and cannot define a general professional second opinion. Primary government sources: State Project Model and Circular R-108/25 PDF.
PRACT-04 GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing Program Costs, US Government Accountability Office, GAO-20-195G, 2020. Government methodology/guidance. Assumptions, data, sensitivity and risk analysis, documentation and independent cost estimates. Illustrates observable controls for material assumptions, data provenance, uncertainty, sensitivity and independent estimates. Cost-estimating subject matter only. It supports specific analytic practices where cost is material, not a universal requirement to build an independent model or quantify all uncertainty. Primary government source: GAO-20-195G.

6. Decision science and judgment research#

ID Bibliographic record, type and normative status Scope and relevant topics Usable principles Limitations, conflicts and applicability Provenance
DS-01 Charles G. Lord, Mark R. Lepper and Elizabeth Preston, “Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 47(6), 1984. Peer-reviewed experiments; evidential, not normative. Biased assimilation and hypothesis testing; instruction to consider opposite explanations. Active search for reasons an initial interpretation could be wrong can reduce some forms of confirmation bias more effectively than a generic instruction to be unbiased. Laboratory and social-judgment contexts; effects do not prove that one formal technique works for every complex organisational decision. Supports a challenge outcome, with “consider the opposite” as optional guidance. Primary article metadata/abstract: PubMed, DOI 10.1037/0022-3514.47.6.1231.
DS-02 Barry M. Staw, “Knee-deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action,” Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 16(1), 1976. Peer-reviewed experimental research. Escalation after prior decisions and negative feedback. Prior responsibility and negative outcomes can increase rather than reduce commitment, supporting independence from the originating decision team and explicit reassessment at later commitment stages. Simulation-based and context-sensitive. It does not show that all continuation decisions are biased or that sunk expenditure is always irrelevant. Primary article: DOI 10.1016/0030-5073(76)90005-2.
DS-03 Hal R. Arkes and Catherine Blumer, “The Psychology of Sunk Cost,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 35(1), 1985. Peer-reviewed field and experimental studies. Sunk-cost effect, continuation and perceived likelihood of success. Irrecoverable prior investment can distort prospective choice; a reviewer should distinguish decision-relevant future consequences from commitment narratives where material. The normative economics of particular cases and non-financial commitments can be more complex than the experiments. Supports testing, not an automatic instruction to abandon. Primary article: DOI 10.1016/0749-5978(85)90049-4.
DS-04 Baruch Fischhoff, “Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 1(3), 1975. Peer-reviewed experimental research. Hindsight bias and perceived predictability. Ex ante documentation of the information, assumptions and uncertainty actually available protects later evaluation from outcome knowledge. Does not specify an engagement standard or retention period. Its strongest implication is traceable contemporaneous reasoning, not prediction accuracy. Primary article: DOI 10.1037/0096-1523.1.3.288.
DS-05 Jonathan Baron and John C. Hershey, “Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 54(4), 1988. Peer-reviewed experiments. Outcome bias; evaluation of decision process versus result. A good process can produce a poor outcome under uncertainty and vice versa; professional defensibility should be judged on the ex ante basis and method, not success of the eventual decision. Original experiments are bounded and cannot establish a complete theory of decision quality. The central effect has received later preregistered replication support (DS-06). Primary article: DOI 10.1037/0022-3514.54.4.569.
DS-06 Sriraj Aiyer, Hoi Ching Kam, Ka Yuk Ng, Nathaniel A. Young, Jiaxin Shi and Gilad Feldman, “Outcomes Affect Evaluations of Decision Quality: Replication and Extensions of Baron and Hershey's (1988) Outcome Bias Experiment 1,” International Review of Social Psychology 36, 2023. Peer-reviewed preregistered replication. Robustness of outcome bias in evaluation. Corroborates the distinction between ex ante decision-process quality and ex post outcome. A well-powered replication of one medical-scenario experiment, not proof that outcomes are irrelevant to learning or updating or that the effect generalises unchanged to board decisions. Primary open-access article: PubMed Central, DOI 10.5334/irsp.751.
DS-07 Garold Stasser and William Titus, “Pooling of Unshared Information in Group Decision Making: Biased Information Sampling During Discussion,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 48(6), 1985. Peer-reviewed experiments. Shared-information bias, discussion and preference-consistent information. Groups may overweight commonly held information and fail to surface unique evidence, supporting deliberate access to material dissenting or unshared information. Laboratory hidden-profile tasks; later literature identifies moderators. It does not justify assuming every team suppresses information or mandating a fixed workshop method. Primary article: DOI 10.1037/0022-3514.48.6.1467.
DS-08 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “On the Psychology of Prediction,” Psychological Review 80(4), 1973. Peer-reviewed theoretical and experimental article. Base-rate neglect, representativeness, reliability of evidence and intuitive prediction. Where relevant reference-class information exists, a reviewer should not allow a vivid case narrative to displace it without reason; evidential reliability matters. Classic but context-dependent evidence; base rates can be disputed or uninformative in novel cases. Supports considering relevant comparators, not a universal quantitative forecast. Primary article: DOI 10.1037/h0034747.
DS-09 Sarah Lichtenstein, Baruch Fischhoff and Lawrence D. Phillips, “Calibration of Probabilities: The State of the Art to 1980,” in Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 1982. Scholarly review of empirical calibration research. Probability judgment, calibration and overconfidence. Subjective confidence can be poorly calibrated; a report should avoid presenting unsupported precision or an unexplained numerical confidence score. Historical review with task and expertise variation. It does not validate a universal confidence scale for unique strategic decisions. Supports restraint rather than a scoring requirement. Primary scholarly chapter record: DOI 10.1017/CBO9780511809477.023; author-hosted text.
DS-10 Deborah J. Mitchell, J. Edward Russo and Nancy Pennington, “Back to the Future: Temporal Perspective in the Explanation of Events,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 2(1), 1989. Peer-reviewed experiments. Prospective hindsight and generation of explanations; foundational evidence associated with premortem reasoning. Imagining that a proposed course has failed can help elicit reasons and overlooked failure modes. It studies explanation generation and does not establish that a formal premortem improves all consequential decisions. Premortem is guidance, not a requirement. Primary article: DOI 10.1002/bdm.3960020103.
DS-11 Philip E. Tetlock, Randall S. Peterson, Charles McGuire, Shi-jie Chang and Peter Feld, “Assessing Political Group Dynamics: A Test of the Groupthink Model,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 63(3), 1992. Peer-reviewed historical/empirical test. Groupthink theory, cohesion, structural faults, decision symptoms and outcomes. Provides qualified support for some group-decision failure patterns while challenging a simple causal account. The mixed results mean “groupthink” is too imprecise to serve as a normative premise. The Standard instead addresses observable problems: suppressed challenge, ignored counterevidence and role dependence. Primary article: DOI 10.1037/0022-3514.63.3.403.
DS-12 Barbara Mellers, Ralph Hertwig and Daniel Kahneman, “Do Frequency Representations Eliminate Conjunction Effects? An Exercise in Adversarial Collaboration,” Psychological Science 12(4), 2001. Peer-reviewed adversarial-collaboration experiment. Joint testing by researchers with competing theoretical positions. Demonstrates that parties holding competing interpretations can agree a test and make disagreement explicit rather than suppress it. Research collaboration about a narrow cognitive effect, not evidence that “adversarial collaboration” must be used in professional engagements. Supports optional methods and transparent dissent. Primary article record: PubMed, DOI 10.1111/1467-9280.00350.
DS-13 Society of Decision Professionals, “Decision Quality,” current professional-practice framework. Established professional literature/practice; not a formal international standard. Decision framing, alternatives, information, values/trade-offs, reasoning and commitment to action. Useful completeness lens: frame, alternatives, information, values, reasoning and commitment should be distinguishable; decision quality is not equivalent to outcome quality. The issuer promotes and certifies a professional community; public evidence for universal validity and conformance thresholds is limited. It does not define an independent second opinion. Used as a practice reference, not normative authority. Primary issuer page: Society of Decision Professionals — Decision Quality.

7. Technology-enabled and delegated analysis#

ID Bibliographic record, type and normative status Scope and relevant topics Usable principles Limitations, conflicts and applicability Provenance
AI-01 Linda J. Skitka, Kathleen L. Mosier and Mark Burdick, “Does Automation Bias Decision-Making?”, International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 51(5), 1999. Peer-reviewed experimental research. Automation omission and commission errors; reduced vigilant information seeking. Human presence alone does not ensure meaningful review; a reviewer must be able and expected to detect, question and override tool output. Aviation-simulation tasks and older automation. Effects cannot establish a universal AI control set, but the underlying failure mode remains directly relevant to delegated analysis. Primary article: DOI 10.1006/ijhc.1999.0252.
AI-02 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act), European Union, 2024, phased application. Binding law when its territorial, actor and system scope applies. High-risk AI logging, human oversight, deployer duties, transparency and accountability. In-scope systems require traceability and effective human oversight designed around competence, authority and the ability to intervene. It confirms that nominal sign-off is not necessarily meaningful oversight. Only legally controlling where the Act applies; many tools used in a second-opinion engagement will not be high-risk systems under the Act. The Standard must not pretend all AI use is governed by Articles 12, 14 or 26. Primary law: EUR-Lex Regulation 2024/1689.
AI-03 Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0), National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST AI 100-1, 2023; revision activity noted in 2026. Voluntary US framework. Govern, Map, Measure and Manage; accountability, transparency, roles, documentation and context-sensitive risk. Supports explicit responsibility, traceability, testing and controls proportionate to context rather than trust in model output. Broad AI-risk framework, not a professional-engagement standard. It should not turn v0.1 into an AI governance code. The current published 1.0, not a future revision, is used. Primary government source: NIST AI RMF 1.0.
AI-04 Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence, OECD/LEGAL/0449, adopted 2019 and updated 2024. Intergovernmental recommendation, non-binding unless implemented. Accountability, transparency, traceability, human-centred values and risk management. Actors should remain accountable according to role and context and provide traceability appropriate to understanding and challenging outputs. Economy-wide principles with high abstraction. They support responsibility and traceability but do not determine engagement evidence or reviewer authorisation. Primary official source: OECD AI Principles accountability page and legal instrument PDF.

8. Drafting conventions and project practice sources#

ID Bibliographic record, type and normative status Scope and relevant topics Usable principles Limitations, conflicts and applicability Provenance
DRAFT-01 ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 — Principles and rules for the structure and drafting of ISO and IEC documents, ISO/IEC, current consolidated version accessed 2026. Formal drafting rules for ISO/IEC documents; not substantive authority for this Standard. Normative verbal forms, terms, structure, references and performance-based drafting. Use shall for requirements, should for recommendations, may for permission and can for possibility/capability; prefer performance requirements over prescriptive design. Westbridge House Standard v0.1 is not an ISO document and must not imply ISO status. The conventions are adopted for clarity only. Primary official source: ISO directives and policies and verbal-form guidance.
WH-01 Westbridge House Canonical Context, Westbridge House project file, current version read 16 August 2026. Westbridge House practice and project context; no independent normative status. Positioning, methodology, safeguards, terminology, outputs and implementation architecture. Supplies real practice problems and candidate controls, including qualification, Accepted Question, adverse-conclusion freedom, evidence governance, dissent, output authorisation and client decision authority. Interested-party source and the object of critical separation. No element becomes public norm without external and methodological testing. It may conflict with the Standard where practice-specific terminology or technology lacks general support. Primary internal source: westbridge-house-canonical-context.md.
WH-02 Project Instructions — Westbridge House Standard, Westbridge House project file, current version read 16 August 2026. Development-governance instruction; controlling for this project, not external normative evidence. Scope, source governance, development cycle, independence, adversarial review, deliverables and restraint. Establishes the 16-stage candidate cycle, separation principle, traceability requirements and prohibition on treating current practice as automatic norm. Governs how v0.1 is developed but cannot substantiate a public requirement about the category. Primary internal source: westbridge-house-project-instructions.md.

9. Source-family findings#

Source family What it already covers well What it does not supply for this category
Corporate governance Decision authority, informed judgment, challenge, conflicts, accountability and non-delegation of board responsibility. Engagement qualification, examiner duties, evidence-relative conclusion and a portable pre-commitment second-opinion category.
Internal audit Objectivity, competence, skepticism, evidence, documentation, reporting and organisational independence. A cross-sector ad hoc engagement outside the internal-audit mandate and a conclusion specifically on a prospective decision basis.
Assurance and audit Acceptance, suitable criteria, independence, evidence, experts, modified conclusions, documentation and quality review. A non-assurance evaluative opinion where the subject is a decision basis, not necessarily subject matter measured against suitable criteria.
Risk management Uncertainty, objectives, appetite, proportionality, scenarios and integration. Independent practitioner role, mandate, challenge and reporting.
Due diligence Scoped evidence review, assumptions, red flags, specialist reliance, limitations and transaction relevance. Independence as a constitutive property, general decision-category boundaries and a portable conclusion architecture.
Decision science Well-demonstrated failure modes and some useful debiasing or elicitation techniques. A professional duty framework, universal effectiveness of a prescribed method or a conformance threshold.
Public gate-review practice Real institutional examples of external review before major commitments and clear retention of decision authority. Cross-sector applicability, common professional terminology and non-governmental proportionality.
AI governance Accountability, traceability, meaningful human oversight and automation-risk concepts. A reason to regulate all technology use or prescribe specific tools within a second opinion.

10. Register limitations and update triggers#

The register should be updated before v1.0 for at least: comparative legal review in additional jurisdictions; sector-specific validation; final effective text of external-expert amendments after 15 December 2026; any final revised ISA 500-series standards; the future ISO 31000 revision; and empirical evaluation of actual second-opinion engagements. Absence of a source from this register does not establish absence of a relevant norm.